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HIV, the prospect of finitude. and biographical self-construction'
by Sebastian Rinken
Abstract
How can individuals in contemporary Western societies constitute themselves 
as mortal beings? This question is addressed, in the following paper, on the 
basis of a series of interviews with Italian persons who have HTV or AIDS. 
Typically, at the time of diagnosis, the knowledge of having HIV was associ­
ated to the prospect of imminent death; this shock provoked the disruption of a 
particularly cherished aspect of the previously taken-for-granted self-defini­
tion. When looking back at their past in the research interview, most respon­
dents had overcome the sense of emergency which had been triggered by the 
event of diagnosis; the thought of imminent death had turned into the lasting 
awareness of finitude. Given this double impact of the thought of mortality, 
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AIDS seems to be in the process of becoming a chronic disease. If the new triple 
drug therapies hold their promise, the character of AIDS as a terminal disease 
may come to belong to the past - at least for those rich or lucky enough both to 
obtain access to those drugs and to tolerate their often insidious side-effects.1 If it 
should indeed be possible to eradicate the Human Immunodeficiency Virus from 
the body even at an advanced stage of disease progression, there would soon be 
hope of prolonged survival for people whose life-expectancy used until now to be 
measured in months, rather than years. Long-term survival of AIDS would turn 
from exception to rule.
This chronification of secondary infection with HIV, if it should indeed come 
true, echoes and reinforces the development of primary HIV-infection throughout 
the past 15 years. In the pandemic's early years, the diagnosis of HTV-positivity 
was prone to be conceived as a "death sentence" just as much as the diagnosis 
with AIDS proper - unless the affected individual was kept by specific back­
ground experiences from taking that association for granted. HIV's chronification 
has not, that is to say, been observed by scientists only. Those among the infected 
who were diagnosed at a time when the connection of HIV/AIDS to impending 
death was still dominant in social discourse, but who then turned out to live on 
far beyond their initial expectations, have made a direct experience of HIV's 
change of character. The close association of impending death to the news of 
HTV-positivity has actually tended to outlast the availability of medical evidence 
for an extended life-expectancy of the infected: for both technical and existential 
reasons, the perspective of the individuals concerned is likely to lag substantially 
behind the scientific state-of-the-art (compare e.g. Schemmann 1996: 129). This
1 For a fairly comprehensive - and intelligible - summary of current biomedical research, 




























































































pattern is apt to repeat itself: the image of death will probably continue to haunt 
many of those diagnosed with AIDS even at a time when, from a medical per­
spective, its potential qualification as a terminal condition has long become sub­
ject to observations regarding the tolerability and efficacy of therapeutic drugs.
The past chronification of HIV differs from the one now thought to be possi­
ble: the complete eradication of the virus from blood and tissue would deserve to 
be qualified as a cure. In contrast, the big change from the early 1980ies to the 
mid-1990ies lay with the average time-span expected to elapse from seroconver­
sion to death: it has extended from just a few years to a dozen and more. Even 
while learning that death is not as imminent as had first been thought, an individ­
ual who lives on with HIV far beyond initial expectations is apt, until now, to 
think of his or her condition as ultimately terminal. Even after the shock of diag­
nosis is overcome, the individual has to face the thought of a life-expectancy 
much shorter than that of his or her age-group.
I shall like to stress that my emphasis on the character of HTV/AIDS as an ul­
timately fatal disease does not contain a deterministic dimension: I do not wish to 
reinforce the notion that any individual diagnosed with HIV or AIDS were prone 
to die of that condition. My remarks are second-order observations: the intense 
connection of HTV/AIDS to the problem of death is a historical fact. The very 
notion of "long-term survival" (as it has been used up to now) implies that the 
continuation of life with the virus beyond certain benchmarks happens against the 
odds. This points to the mental difficulty of overcoming the potentially paralyz­
ing effects of the thought that one's death may be close; the achievement consists 
of making prolonged survival look like a real possibility. Long-term survivors do 
not deny they have a fatal disease - they just live with one. Under normal cir­
cumstances (in contemporary Western societies and with regard to the age-groups 
most affected by HTV, that is to say: against the background of a taken-for- 




























































































that one may die soon tends to be conceived as either highly terrifying or just 
unreal. In contrast, under the condition of intense association of one's immu­
nological state with impending death, to think that one may as well live on con­
stitutes a big achievement (compare Callen 1990). The appreciation of the fu­
ture's uncertainty hinges on the sort of certainty against which it is set.
I do not intend to reinforce the notion that infection with HTV will inevitably 
lead to AIDS, and that AIDS will inevitably lead to death; I am not interested in 
mortality patterns in a statistical sense. I wish to better understand the experience 
of mortality as it is made by persons with HIV/AIDS. For all those who sponta­
neously associated their diagnosis to the thought of impending death, one crucial 
problem of living with HTV or AIDS consists of the management of that thought. 
Even after the first shock has faded, it is impossible to simply get back to the 
previous assumption of an open future. The individual has to establish a new re­
lation to the problem of death: neither can survival to old age be again taken for 
granted, nor can death be continuously expected as imminent. Uncertainty about 
the future has to be accommodated with respect to the individual's life and self: 
the individual has to constitute him- or herself as a mortal being. The awareness 
of having to die too soon has to be rendered compatible with a meaningful con­
duct of life and a valued self-description.
Life with HTV and AIDS can hence be analyzed as a process of self-constitu­
tion as mortal, and the variety of ways in which individuals with HIV or AIDS 
construct their lives and selves can be observed with a view to the form which 
constitutes that variety's common denominator. This terminology, and the corre­
sponding will to knowledge, are inspired by the last period of Foucault's work, 
which was devoted to the exploration of historically specific patterns of subjec­
tivity with regard to the experience of sexuality (Foucault 1984, 1984a). My 
Ph.D. research (Rinken 1996), on which the following considerations rely, aims 




























































































no comparison between the scope and depth of Foucault's scholarly enterprise 
and the modest results I am able to present. Still, the perspective from which I 
study HTV/AIDS owes a lot to Foucault: from a series of autobiographical narra­
tives, I try to discern the form of the self-constructions of individuals who have 
become intensely aware of their finitude as a result of the diagnosis of HIV or 
AIDS. Which role does the thought of mortality play in those constructs? How 





























































































As is well known, Foucault's inquiry into the experience of sexuality led him way 
back into Greek and Roman history. This is because the specificity of our 
(modem Western) pattern of making a particular experience can be observed 
clearly only against the background of historically or culturally distinct such pat­
terns. For any study which, like mine, relies primarily on empirical material from 
a contemporary Western society, this means that assumptions as to its specificity 
can be introduced by reference to literature only. Why bother, then, about the 
historical and cultural dimension at all? This question can not be answered with­
out going to some extent into the heart of the matter. I shall make my point by re­
ferring (in a daringly sketchy way) to two sorts of literature: the history and so­
ciology of death and dying, on one hand, and the history of the relation between 
individual and society, on the other.
Has death in modem society turned into a taboo? As is increasingly recognized 
(compare Walter 1991, Mellor 1993), the growing body of literature which sus­
tains that assumption is self-defeating in that a topic about which so much pub­
lishing is done can hardly be termed a taboo. But that literature is after some­
thing: more or less consciously, it aims at exploring modem attitudes and prac­
tices towards death in their historical (and cultural) specificity. Some basic ob­
servations, such as the absence or poverty of secular funeral- and mourning ritu­
als or the institutional appropriation of death and dying, can hardly be contested. 
Yet, at the heart of the taboo-debate lies an observation which goes well beyond 
the lack of shared practices and the separation of death from the everyday world. 
At bottom, the idea is that modem individuals be more scared by death than their 
ancestors.
I have cautiously written "the idea" - because its validation is an awkward en­
terprise. Yet, if one takes it that the work of scholars such as Philippe Arids 




























































































modem individual's specific attitude towards death simply as a complement of 
institutional developments (by arguing that the alleged "taboo" be simply a result 
of increased longevity, i.e. the symptom of a lack of concern), there are two pos­
sible explanations for modernity's particular distance from death: its reason can 
either he with the material idea of death, or else with particular characteristics of 
modem individuality. It is easy to see that the first of those options can be dis­
carded: just think of the terrifying effect which the thought of death ought to have 
in the Middle Ages, when its material image consisted not just of the end of life, 
but potentially (and who could be sure not to have sinned?) of exposure to the 
Purgatory. This is to say that, on sober comparison, the secular idea of death does 
not seem to be the most dreadful (apart from the fact that observations on the 
denial of death have also been made in countries, such as the U.S., where the 
secular vision of death is, put cautiously, not uncontested). Yet the average Me­
dieval sinner had tools for handling that dread which rendered it manageable - a 
sort of tools which, in modernity, seems to have come to lack. Indeed, the me­
mento mori was a widespread practice then - to the extent that it is now widely 
associated with Christian faith.
Erroneously, as the history of philosophy shows: there were a number of 
philosophical schools which advocated the thought of one's own death as a tech­
nique of self (Hadot 1981). Those schools, though, could rely on the assumption 
that there was a definite standard of conduct and self-organization external to the 
self, such as the Cosmos. This is to say, when confronted intensely with the 
thought of their own finitude, people were not threatened by meaninglessness. 
Similarly, when dreaded by the thought of the Purgatory, Medieval Christians 
knew they had to step up compliance with the moral code (Arids 1977; Delumeau 
1978). In contrast, for modem individuals, a definite standard is not available any 
longer: any affiliation to sources of shared meaning, including religious faith, has 




























































































This leads to the second body of literature on which I would like to comment 
briefly: the history of the relationship between self and society. Modem society's 
lack of shared, definite standards does not regard patterns of conduct only: it ex­
tends to the way in which individuals define their selves. There are no external 
reference-points any more which would unambiguously locate the self: the defi­
nition of identity has become, in modernity, an explicitly individual problem. As 
Luhmann notes, the substitution of the traditional hierarchical order of society by 
the differentiation of self-referential functional subsystems has brought about the 
impossibility for the individual to establish a viable self-description with regard 
to a fixed social position; rather, the self is now constructed by reference to its 
supposed singularity (Luhmann 1984: 354 ff„ 1989: 149 ff.). Similarly (albeit 
writing from entirely different quarters), Taylor has stressed modernity's histori­
cal distinctiveness in that the individual is held to define her or his ultimate hori­
zon by reference to personal attributes, rather than to qualities of class, rank, or 
status (Taylor 1989: esp. 368 ff.). The singularity of the individual is not an ob­
jective quality, though - it is the result of an ongoing process of assessment. In 
modernity, as Giddens argues, self-identity has turned into a reflexive enterprise: 
it "is not a distinctive trait, or even a collection of traits, possessed by the indi­
vidual. It is the self as reflexively understood by the person in terms o f her or his 
biography" (1991: 53).
This is not to say, of course, that people living in traditional societies would be 
incapable of reflecting on their own lives - nor do I wish to imply that a modem 
individual's self-reflection takes places in a social vacuum. Yet, unless the litera­
ture to which I have referred is all misled, only in modernity has the individual's 
own lifetime turned into the central basis for defining identity; correspondingly, 
only in modernity has the individual turned expressly into the chief actor of that 
process of definition. Much more than the assessment of definitions imputed on 
the self by others in a given moment, the construction of one's self with a view to 




























































































foremost audience for a biographical self-construction is the individual her- or 
himself: especially with regard to lifetime issues, one's inner dialogue enjoys a 
privileged position (compare Mead 1934: 139; Rinken 1996: 305 ff.).
Now, it is easy to follow Mellor (1993) in his assertion, elaborated by refer­
ence to Giddens (1991), that the modem individual's historically distinctive reli­
ance on biographical self-construction, on one hand, be related to the specifically 
modem problem with death, on the other. But is it true, as Mellor (1993: 18) 
writes, that the constitutive reflexivity of the modem individual can not possibly 
help "deal with the phenomenon of death, since this is a universal parameter 
within which reflexivity occurs, rather than an object to which reflexivity can be 
convincingly applied"? In the context of Mellor's discussion, this assertion serves 
as a stepping-stone towards the claim that the problem of death needs to be 
brought back to the community - i.e., to the level of shared social practices. For 
anybody not aprioristically committed to that goal, it may be worthwhile to con­
sider the relation between modem individuality and the thought of mortality more 
in detail. Granted that we can never conclusively know what comes after death, 
the modem individual's reflexivity may still be of help in dealing with the aware­
ness of finitude. The problem would hence lie with specific ways in which self­
reflections are performed, rather than with biographical reflexivity as such; in 
particular, it can be suspected to lie with a specific sort of relations between past, 
present, and future.
Future? To think of one's death means to think of the future's absence, or else 
of one's own future's absence. Events which trigger the intense awareness of one's 
own finitude do, by definition, often imply that there is not much time left ahead. 
As far as medical diagnoses are concerned, such awareness will usually be pro­
voked by a "terminal" diagnosis, which in general implies that the life-expectancy 
of the individual be estimated in terms of months or, at best, a strictly limited 
number of years. Typically, this was also the case with individuals diagnosed as 




























































































as imminent; there was to be no future. All those who have lived on for an ex­
tended period of time after that diagnosis, though, have had occasion to observe 
that the thought of death is not necessarily incompatible with future life: after all, 
life has continued despite the ongoing (albeit not always manifest) awareness that 
it may soon draw to its close.
Awareness of mortality thus has to find a place within the affected individual's 
self-construction - in a double sense. First, the biographical self-construction per­
formed at a given time can be sustained as valid only if it is compatible with the 
possibility of dying rather soon - otherwise, any reminder of one's finitude may 
cause depressive crises. Second, that self-construction has to accommodate the 
effects of the event which first provoked the invasion of the thought of death into 
consciousness. For individuals living with HIV or AIDS, the challenge of bio­
graphical self-construction is constituted by this double matrix of lasting aware­
ness of finitude, on one hand, and past disruption (if diagnosis was indeed per­





























































































In the Spring of 1993,1 conducted semi-structured interviews with 21 Italian in­
dividuals with HTV or AIDS. With the exception of two personal acquaintances, 
contact to interviewees was established via associations of or for the HIV-posi­
tive. I did not try to direct the composition of my group of interviewees except 
for the inclusion of as broad a range of epidemiological features as possible. As a 
result, eleven of my respondents are likely to have been infected via sex among 
men (three of these men also made use of intravenous drugs at some point), six 
(two men and four women) were doubtlessly infected by shared needles; three 
women were infected by straight sex with partners whose past drug-use habit 
(two cases) or whose infection with HIV due to blood-products (one case) was 
unknown; finally, I also interviewed the ex-fiancée of this last woman, who had 
caught the virus from products for the treatment of haemophilia (these two latter 
cases were personal acquaintances). Fourteen of my interviewees are thus men, 
seven are women; age at diagnosis ranges from 19 to 48 years (in two-thirds of 
cases, from 19 to 29 years), and time of diagnosis ranges from 1983/4 to 1992 
(with twelve cases diagnosed in 1987 or earlier).
Thus, some respondents had a long experience of life with the virus; others 
had been diagnosed as little as one year before interview. Yet due to the particu­
larly slow move of Italian public awareness campaigns from advertisements em­
phasizing the risks of transmission and the need to avoid it, on one hand, toward 
a message underlining the chronic character of the disease and the need for HTV- 
positives and -negatives to share daily life, on the other, all my interviewees were 
diagnosed under the circumstance of a primarily "terroristic" social image of their 
condition2: the association of imminent death imposed itself spontaneously on
2 Compare Berridge/Strong (1992) for a periodization of AIDS-policy and Moss (1990) 




























































































close to all of them. From the indications given by my interviewees, one can infer 
that more than two thirds had been infected with HTV at least five years before 
the interview (with a range from one and a half years to eleven years and a half); 
with one exception, respondents did not suffer from serious physical constraints 
due to ill health at time of interview (although a further four were in a suffi­
ciently advanced a state of disease progression for their state of health to be 
termed precarious). About one third of my respondents have to be classified as 
"persons with AIDS" according to current epidemiological rules.
All of the interviews began the same way. I mentioned that my questions were 
going to refer to daily life with the virus, to then say that, before moving on to 
that argument, I wanted to jump back into the past and learn something about life 
before HIV-positivity. I asked each respondent to volunteer whatever came to her 
or his mind at that regard. My initial question thus implied a relevant difference 
between past and present - an implication which was always grasped by my in­
formants, albeit not necessarily in an affirmative way. This is to say, while asking 
for an evaluation (rather than matter-of-fact information), I did not force the dis­
tinction between past and present upon my respondents: who did not think that it 
fit his or her case was free to say so, and indeed did (as we will see below). My 
initial question provided a good start both in establishing the lifetime perspective 
as the interview's reflective dimension, and (given that this perspective was not 
perceived as far-fetched, but proved pertinent to my respondents' life with the 
virus even in those cases in which diagnosis had not constituted a watershed) in 
establishing myself as a person sufficiently well-acquainted with the problem of 
HIV/AIDS to be told delicate details about that experience. Throughout the rest 
of the interview, I tried to strike a balance between follow-ups on information 
already obtained, on one hand, and my predefined areas of interests (in particular, 
the way in which the thought of death had been handled both mentally and so­
cially), on the other. Ideally, this simply meant asking for further information on 




























































































My prompt situated the interview immediately at the level of reflection. The 
initial question implied the, if rudimentary, theory that knowledge of one's own 
HIV-positivity may make a difference to the person affected - indeed that it may 
literally affect that person. Banal as that assumption may sound, to start the in­
terview with this question constituted a methodological choice. This procedure 
runs counter to the current wisdom of the "narrative interview" school, namely 
that the interviewer has to abstain from requests for evaluations until matter-of- 
fact information has exhaustively been provided (Schfltze 1984, Rosenthal 1995). 
General doubts as to basic assumptions of that approach (in particular, the pre­
supposition of a close correspondence between the layers of a narration estab­
lished with a minimum of external interference, on one hand, and the narrated 
events as they were experienced, on the other) become all the more pervasive 
with regard to an experience such as HIV-positivity. Rather than cherishing the 
illusion that the interviewee's narrative may simply reproduce experience "as it 
really was", my approach emphasizes the character of any observation made in 
the interview as an action taken at that very time (compare Mead 1932). While 
talking about their lives and selves, my respondents did not just reproduce past 
experience: they reflected upon their past in the light of the present, and about 
both present and past in the light of an uncertain future. This is not to say that I 
think respondents invented their stories out of the blue. I believe that the selec­
tivity and structure of an autobiographical report be a result of the narrator's self- 
definition at the time of narrating - and that this self-definition is in turn deter­
mined crucially by outstanding life-events. The narrator's sense of identity, on 
one hand, and her or his life-story, on the other, mutually constitute one another. 
Any inference as to the "reality" of past events is thus a second-order interpreta­
tion: it is the result of the social scientist's effort at understanding the informant's 
construction of the past in its relation to the present. On the assumption that a 
traumatic event leaves important traces on the self, and that the relationship be­




























































































cisely by a question regarding the difference made by that event, my initial 
prompt can be appreciated as conducive to valuable and valid results. It may be 
worth noting that the main theorist of the German narrative school has explicitly 
acknowledged, shortly before turning the distinction between narration and 
evaluation into a methodological doctrine, that any retrospective account of one's 
life inevitably comprises a critical, reflexive, hence an evaluative dimension 
(Schfltze 1976: 20). Specifically with regard to traumatic experiences, Schutze's 
pupil Rosenthal has recently stressed that the expectation of a close correspon­
dence between the layers of lived experience and the layers of an unrestrained 
narration of one's life will not be fulfilled (Rosenthal 1995: 120; 130). My inter­
view technique builds on such insights, rather than the current orthodoxy.
The interview transcripts were interpreted in two steps, corresponding to the 
two main phases of work with ideal types in historical research as outlined by 
Max Weber (1904: 184 ff.; compare Schelting 1922: 684), namely their estab­
lishment and subsequent use; the idea of applying this method to autobiographi­
cal narratives I owe to Gerhardt (1985). On the basis of all the interview material, 
an ideal-type hypothesis as to the crucial challenge of Living with HTV or AIDS 
was established; this conceptualization regards the consequences of the diagnosis 
of HTV for the affected individuals pre-established self-description. Subse­
quently, this ideal-type was used as a tool for the detailed interpretation of se­
lected single interviews. In what is generally referred to as a hermeneutic circle, 
the result of the in-depth interpretation of single cases has come to in turn rein­
force and specify the original interpretative hypothesis. I would like to stress that 
the ideal-type generated in the first step of interpretation has the character of a 
conceptual yardstick - it is not a self-fulfilling prophecy. While rather closely 
grasping the characteristics of some cases in terms of a hypothesis-forming 
model, in others it just serves as a means of contrast. This clearly means that the 
results of my in-depth case interpretations are not independent of the kind of 




























































































derived form the empirical material itself, it then came in turn to be applied to the 
generation of insights regarding that very material. Rather than claiming that no 
other second-order-observations than mine would have been possible on the basis 
of the given empirical material, I feel it is a matter of intellectual honesty to lay 
bare the character of my (just as any other) interpretation as partly contingent on 
the observer's focus of interest: differently to what the German narrative school 
tends to believe, the second-order-observer is not just the voice of the material as 
it speaks to us. For my procedure, it is thus essential to establish the non-arbitrary 




























































































Diagnosis of HIV and the "diagnosis of the self'
As a result of the pioneering works of Blaxter (1976), Bury (1982), Charmaz 
(1983, 1987, 1991) and Strauss (Strauss et al. 1984/1975; Corbin/Strauss 1987), 
the assumption that the onset of chronic illness is experienced as a biographical 
disruption has come to be widely recognized in recent years. Beyond practical 
considerations, medical sociology now routinely conceives the onset of chronic 
illness as an "assault on self-hood" (Bury 1991: 456): the constraints imposed by 
illness are not limited to the individual's range of activities, but affect taken-for- 
granted images of self. Having previously been conceived as capable of perform­
ing tasks which are now beyond reach, the self is downgraded (and possibly, dur­
ing periods of remission, again upgraded) in response to the level of physical per­
formance and, consequently, the state of social relations (Charmaz 1983, 1987). 
The integration of the different periods of life which are marked by one or sev­
eral "turning points" (Charmaz 1991) related to the experience of illness trans­
forms reflections on one's course of life into "biographical work" (Corbin/Strauss 
1987): the continuity and unity of the self can not be taken for granted any 
longer. Rather, the individual may seek to actively constitute bridges between old 
and new by means of a variety of techniques such as contextualizing or bio­
graphical recasting.
The basic assumption of all this literature is that changes of the self-image re­
flect actual or, eventually, anticipated changes of the physical self: losses of self 
are thought to be triggered by the manifestation and/or diagnostic identification 
of symptoms ("body failure", as Corbin/Strauss call it). As far as somatic illness 
is concerned, that assumption seems perfectly adequate. Yet, with respect to the 
diagnosis of HTV (and, to some extent, of AIDS), it tends to veil an important 
aspect of the repercussions which such a diagnosis may have on the self. The 
effects of diagnosis with a terminal condition (with a condition, that is, under­




























































































suddenly facing imminent death, the self may be shattered in ways unrelated to 
any specific constraint imposed by physical disfunctionality. Diagnosis with HIV 
is prone to trigger the anticipation not of partial, but of total body failure. What 
are its consequences for the self?
Research on HIV/AIDS is just beginning to explore this dimension. Through­
out the first decade of the pandemic, the social sciences have largely focused on 
the potential moral connotations of the main means of transmission (compare 
Poliak et al. 1992); biographical disruption and biographical work have thus first 
been studied in terms of the individual's sense of belonging to a group of peers, 
as defined by the practices which had caused virus transmission 
(Carricaburu/Pierret 1995). Most of the researchers who were concerned specifi­
cally with the association of this condition to the problem of death have either 
just classified reactions to diagnosis according to psychiatric categories (compare 
Kalichman/Sikkema 1994 for a literature review), or narrowly focused on the 
process of physical decline and dying proper (generally building on the approach 
first introduced by Kflbler-Ross 1970). Only few studies have as yet looked at the 
diagnosis of HIV as a traumatic event affecting everyday assumptions about one­
self and the world independently of the manifestation of symptoms or the asso­
ciation of HTV with potentially negative moral evaluations of conduct. Weitz' 
important monograph (1991) places the accent on moral stigma and physical de­
bilitation rather than on the disruptive potential of the thought of death; the early 
impulses by Sandstrom (1990) and Siegel/Krauss (1991) have found little echo. 
While Schwartzberg (1993) and N6d61ec (1994) provide interesting preliminary 
analyses of ways in which meaning can be ascribed to a life marked by diagnosis. 
Shea (1995) suggests to analyze the threat of meaninglessness incurred by diag­
nosis with a view to the plurality of social constructions of HIV/AIDS. According 
to Shea, all of the individual's previous sense of identity is rendered highly pre­
carious by the news of diagnosis; he speaks of a situation of anomie. In contrast, 




























































































tions about the future. But is not the future dimension of conduct and self inti­
mately related to the individual's pre-established sense of identity? And is not 
one's self composed of a variety of aspects which may not all be equally affected 
by the news that one's death be close?
As Corbin and Strauss (1987: 249) have put it with a view to all kinds of body 
failure, "when a chronic illness comes crashing into someone's life (...), the who I 
was in the past and the who hoped to be in the future, in whole or in part, are 
rendered discontinuous with the me of the present". This statement illustrates 
well both the general line of thought which has come to be widely accepted in 
medical sociology (namely, that the onset of chronic illness may disrupt one's 
sense of identity) and the two crucial issues on which I would like to extend now 
with regard to the specific nature of the diagnosis of HTV-positivity (and of 
AIDS, if its diagnosis is made on the basis of a T-4 cell count below the marker 
level of 200 per milliliter blood, rather than the manifestation of an opportunistic 
infection or cancer). HIV is specific as against chronic illness in general in that it 
is not, during its asymptomatic stage, an illness proper rather, it constitutes the 
announcement of a future illness. At the same time, HIV is bound to be associ­
ated with the prospect of premature death. This double specificity raises two cru­
cial issues: firstly, the relation between past and future among the loss of self 
which is suffered, and secondly, the nature of the affected self as either unitary or 
multiple. In thinking about these issues, I adopt the conceptualization of con­
sciousness as a self-reproductive system as developed by the German sociologist 
Niklas Luhmann (1984: 354 ff.; 1987), which I blend with basic insights of 
American social psychology (Fiske/Taylor 1991; Markus 1977; Markus/Nurius 
1986).3
3 See Rinken 1996: 108 ff. and, for a more detailed formulation specifically in terms of 




























































































In a nutshell, the theory of self-reproductive systems presupposes that con­
sciousness, like any other system, operates recursively by reference to its own 
elements, rather than by direct access to the environment in terms of input and 
output. That is not to say that self-reproductive (or autopoietic) systems would 
exist in a vacuum; yet all of the system's environment, including news and events, 
is observed by the system on its own terms. Such observations have binary char­
acter consciousness operates by distinguishing, i.e. by indicating this rather than 
a contrasting that. In principle, this process goes on and on; any observation can 
in turn be observed by its successors. It is thus possible, as a subsequent observa­
tion, to switch to the other side of a distinction that was previously used, or else 
to observe a distinction's unity. It is also possible to make observations on the op­
erating system itself in its quality as a system. Yet it is important to note that, 
contrary to observations in general, self-descriptions of the system are by defini­
tion not bi-stable. While consciousness can switch without any difficulty from 
the expected observation, say, that the sky be blue, to the observation that it is 
indeed covered by threatening clouds, it is not possible to simply dump pre-es­
tablished observations regarding the system's own distinctiveness as against its 
environment, and replace them with their opposites. The more important the pre- 
established view of self was, the less possible will such a replacement be. The 
autopoiesis of consciousness may thus run into trouble when self-descriptions of 
the system are suddenly observed as defied.
This is bound to happen at time of diagnosis. The result of the serological test 
is likely to be interpreted in terms of a dichotomy: "negative" is associated to fu­
ture life, "positive" to the threat of death. This contrast regards not just the sys­
tem's future, but by the same token its present self-description as a system which





























































































will continue to operate in the future. Consciousness knows that the continuation 
of its operations relies on a living body. With a view to this crucial self-descrip­
tion, the system oscillates between the two poles of a binary distinction. The 
prospect of imminent death can not be accepted as a description of self - yet the 
previously unshattered trust into an open future can not simply be resumed.
What is going to happen at this point? Given the difficulties it encounters 
when tackling the news of positivity, consciousness may go on by switching to 
other topics, i.e. by letting itself distract from that news. Yet due to its relevance, 
the thought of imminent death is bound to return. I hence suppose that, sooner 
rather than later, the system's self-description will be affected in a second way. 
The news of positivity is conceived as a threat to life; it hence contradicts the 
pre-established view of self as striving towards an open future. It thus seems 
plausible to assume that that news will, in a second step, be referred to a specific 
way in which the affected individual used to strive towards the future. Rather 
than to the generic quality of being alive, the threat of death is connected to a 
distinctive quality of the individual, namely to a definition of self which used to 
constitute, prior to diagnosis, a relevant element of her or his sense of identity.
This specification of the aspect of self which is particularly threatened by 
death is apt to make matters worse. Schematically, there are two possibilities: 
either this old self-definition is maintained even in the presence of the threat of 
death, or else it is perceived as invalidated by that threat. Given that the condition 
on which that old self-definition had relied, namely the taken-for-granted nature 
of an open future, has been denied by the news of diagnosis, I think it is fair to 
assert that the second of those alternatives is more likely. This is what I suggest 
to call the "diagnosis of the self': a specific aspect of self is singled out from a 
range of possible candidates (from the working self, as social psychology has it) 
as threatened by imminent death. A specific way in which the individual used to 




























































































crisis of an established way of conceiving the distinctiveness of the system as 
against its environment, i.e. its identity.
The diagnosis of HIV thus works as a "dispositive of truth" (Hahn 1994) - al­
beit in a way which is not necessarily related to the two categories usually used 
by social scientists to account of that event. The "diagnosed" aspect of self may 
relate to the most prominent means of virus-transmission, and hence to the social 
groups distinguished by the respective practices - yet this connection is neither 
automatic nor standardized. Many among the infected were fully aware, prior to 
getting tested, that they had engaged in sex between men or into intravenous 
drug-use - and in the case of many, those practices were fully accepted by the 
relevant social environment. This, in other words, is not the news they conceive 
when learning to be HIV-positive. Rather than the fact of having used drugs or of 
having had sex with other men, I thus suppose that it will often be the way in 
which the individual used to move in the respective social environment that plays 
a part in the determination of the aspect of self which is particularly affected. I 
certainly do not wish to obscure the possibility that the disruptive potential of 
diagnosis may in some cases be enhanced, and in many more cases directed, by 
the fact that the moral mainstream does not approve of the practices by means of 
which most people in the industrialized world have become infected with HIV. 
But it does not need moral concerns to turn knowledge of one's positivity into 
The Big News: the association of a sharply reduced life-expectancy will do. 
Similarly, I do evidently not mean to claim that the diagnosis of HIV (and, all the 
more so, of AIDS) may not, at the level of the self-definitions most affected by 
that news, be related to the onset of symptoms. Rather, I wish to highlight the 
fact that there is no necessary connection between such a diagnosis, on one hand, 
and the disruption of aspects of self related to specific bodily functions which are 
observed or expected to fail, on the other. While some people may have a suffi­
ciently clear idea of this disease's potential manifestations to be scared right at 




























































































sence of manifest symptoms, this is not necessarily the case. Rather, the associa­
tion of impending suffering and death may more broadly be understood as a 
threat to future life.
To summarize: on the basis of a first consideration of my interview material in 
the light of current theories regarding the procedural character of consciousness 
and the status of self-definitions as elements of that ongoing process, I believe 
that the sudden irruption of the concrete prospect of total body failure into one's 
mind is apt to provoke the disruption of a specific aspect of self, rather than of 
the totality of all the assumptions which one used to hold about oneself previ­
ously. The biographical work to be undertaken during one's life with the virus 
will thus specifically regard the aspect of self which, on mentally processing the 
news, has been singled out as specifically distinctive of one's own way of striving 
towards the future - which is to say: of one's past. Together with the future, one's 
past is perceived as lost; the very moment of being singled out as outstandingly 
relevant for ones recent past spells deep trouble for the respective aspect of self.
The above conceptualization of diagnosis accentuates some qualities of the di­
agnosis with HIV/AIDS, while de-emphasizing others. This is not to neglect the 
existence of those other qualities, or to project that conceptualization into my 
empirical material regardless of evidence. On the contrary, the ideal-type of 
"diagnosis of se lf' which I just sketched is the product of observations on the 
interview material; it constitutes an instrument for the generation of further, more 
specific empirical observations, rather than a final result. The crucial justification 





























































































Types of biographical self-construction
How do people with HIV or AIDS construct their lives and selves? In the follow­
ing, I will present the five distinct patterns of biographical self-construction 
which have emerged from the 21 interviews conducted for this inquiry. These 
patterns constitute analytical types in that they exhaustively cover the range of 
ways in which one may locate one's self with respect to a past marked by the 
knowledge of positivity.4 The typology is established with regard to the periodi­
zation of one's life relative to the diagnosis of HIV/AIDS. Is the implication of 
the interview's initial prompt, namely the distinction of subperiods of life before 
and after diagnosis, accepted? In other words, does diagnosis take on the role of a 
decisive biographical marker or turning point? If yes, how is the self at time of 
interview related to those two subperiods of life? And how are the effects of di­
agnosis on the self taken account of?
Much of the discussion of each pattern will concentrate on one exemplary 
case; in a second step, I will make observations regarding the background experi­
ences which facilitate the manifestation of each particular pattern of self-con­
struction. In focusing largely on one exemplary case, I am well aware that there is 
a tendency for readers to skip such discussions and move on directly to the more 
general conclusions. Any reader of this piece of writing is free to do so - at a 
price. The more general observations which I will make further on presuppose 
familiarity with the patterns of self-construction as previously presented. Like it 
or not, the best way of presenting such patterns is to discuss one exemplary case
4 The types presented here constitute the possible range of variations in terms of 
extremes; self-constructions somewhere mid-way between two of these types (such as 
the experience of an invalidating disruption in occasion of the diagnosis of AIDS years 





























































































in some detail. I shall furthermore like to stress that the selection of cases as ex­
emplary was achieved by one simple criterion, namely the extreme character of 
the respective self-construction with regard to the interview prompt. In other 
words, the five cases which I will now present constitute the extreme poles of a 
field of options within which all of my other respondents, and supposedly (as I 
would dare to claim) all modem Western individuals living with HIV or AIDS, 
can be allocated.
One final remark: my criterion for selecting cases as exemplary entails a po­
tential distortion which I would not know how to avoid, but which I would like to 
signal as such. As Charmaz (1991: 274) has noted, the "more articulate or ex­
pressive men and women made more apparent what remained implicit in others". 
In other words: while building on the reasonable assumption that observations 
and patterns voiced by particularly articulate informants be potentially pertinent 
not only to their personal case, my approach indubitably privileges individuals 
with good communicative skills. This means that there is an "expressiveness 
bias" - not just in this research but probably in any sociological study based on 
qualitative interviews for the simple reason that such research relies on the par­
ticipants' words.
Invalidation
"What comes to my mind?" (Yes.) "A happy-go-lucky attitude." (Happy-go- 
lucky?) "That's a vast notion, right. But what comes to my mind is mainly the, 
eh, ability to face daily problems not in a way ...s that is, without this reference 5
5 Three dots signal a break, i.e. a temporaneous interruption of the interviewee's flux of 
words; three bracketed dots stand for an editorial omission in the context of just one 





























































































to seropositivity, that means very, in a very relaxed way, powerful when facing 
life situations, difficulties, joys, sorrows, anything in a very - in a devil-may- 
care manner. You see?” (Tell me more about it. Maybe you can tell me an epi­
sode to make me understand better.) "Well, being happy, perhaps having at 
times to face negative life situations, you see, but to take them in a matter-of- 
fact way, and hence to live as well as possible." (That's the situation now?) 
"No, that's the situation before. Do you understand? That is, not to be afraid 
o f difficulties and, for better or worse, i f  one has to struggle to live, struggle, 
because it makes part o f life. You see? Devil-may-care in this sense o f not let­
ting oneself get tangled up heavily in one's daily problems." (And now?) "Now 
anything seems very difficult to me, even a small problem."
This is the initial sequence6 of my interview with Giulio, who had been 23 
years old at time of diagnosis. I have chosen to document this sequence in detail 
because, as a rule, each interviewee's reaction to the initial prompt contained a 
decisive clue as to the respective individual's biographical self-construction. In 
the case of Giulio, it is evident from the start that diagnosis indeed does, at time 
of interview, assume the position as the crucial event in relation to which life 
breaks down in a before and an after. While by far most respondents reported to 
have experienced diagnosis as an intense shock, only a few of them were, at time
indicate that I have jumped from one such answer to another in order to compose a 
concise quotation on a specific topic in an effort not to overly try my readers' patience.
6 More precisely, given that all the interviews were conducted in Italian, the interview 
quotes throughout this article are all translations from the Italian. Well aware of the 
problems spelled by the translation of empirical material which is the object of intense 
interpretation, I have tried to strike a balance between sticking to the original wording as 
closely as possible, on one hand, and conveying the meaning of that wording by a less- 




























































































of interview, still caught up in the aftermath of that shock. This is the case with 
Giulio, though: as he recounts, while he had managed daily life with ease and 
guts prior to diagnosis, he lost this ability in that very moment without retrieving 
it ever since. This is all the more remarkable because, when talking to me, about 
eight years have passed since he learned about his HIV-positivity.
I shall like to stress that Giulio's lasting crisis was and is not provoked by, or 
related to, the onset of physical symptoms. He has never suffered from any of the 
somatic afflictions which may hit people with HTV/AEDS; his immunological 
situation is actually one of the best among all my respondents. Back at time of 
diagnosis, his decision to get tested was bom out of the suspicion that he may 
have caught the virus when engaging into an extra-relational adventure. So con­
vinced was Giulio that he had become infected that he repeated the test after it 
had first turned out negative. By the time when his doubts were confirmed, he 
had already passed the virus over to his long-time lover. Remarkably, when 
struck by that news, his partner said that he was ready to share this experience 
with Giulio - rather than placing blame on him or rejecting him. It is hard to 
imagine a more supportive reaction to so devastating a news. To no avail: Giulio 
himself felt so deeply distressed about, as he says, having destroyed his lover's 
life that he himself broke off the relationship shortly later. At time of interview, 
he blames himself intensely for having done so - much more than for his original 
responsibility for having infected his partner. He also intensely blames himself 
for having quit a promising professional career because of incompatibilities that 
he had perceived with his needs for medical surveillance; he also blames himself 
for having lost some of his independence, moving back home to his parents' place 
for some time, and for earning his living with low-skill jobs now.
In short: Giulio has entered a vicious circle. Throughout the years which have 
passed since diagnosis, he has increasingly lost ground in his battle with HIV, 




























































































original event of diagnosis ran counter to the way in which he had led his life up 
to that moment, the past unsatisfactory management of one difficulty came to 
spur further failures with regard to others. The culmination of Giulio's troubles 
lies with the attitude which he has come to assume with respect to potential long­
term intimate relationships. While having talked about his HTV-positivity to old 
friends, to his family, to HTV-positive peers, and even to an ex-employer, he has 
never dared, throughout all of the years since diagnosis and despite of the en­
couraging reactions obtained to those communications, to disclose his serostatus 
to a person with whom he would have thought possible to start a lasting loving 
relationship. Interestingly, Giulio does not perceive any problem with having 
(protected) sex with partners of whom he does not think as potential stable lovers 
- as he puts it, otherwise he could as well move to a monastery. The reason for, 
throughout the past years, having always left those of his sexual partners to 
whom he felt seriously attracted, stemmed from his inability to disclose his sero­
status. Rather than telling his would-be companions that he had HTV, and thus 
risking the end of the relationship as a result of the other's possible rejection, he 
himself made sure it would end - by not telling, and fleeing instead. What keeps 
this vicious circle going? Why does Giulio not resort to his old seifs quality of 
facing difficulties bravely, now that he needs that quality more than ever?
This is the problem. Just as with the other cases selected for detailed presenta­
tion, I can not go into detail more than that in the course of the present exposi­
tion; I have to limit myself to an illustration of what I have come to see, on close 
sequential analysis of the case, as the heart of the matter. When confronted with 
the news that he was HIV-positive, Giulio's previously taken-for-granted noncha­
lance was shattered. In responding to that news, he was not able to act according 
to what he had thought of as a quality of himself: rather than facing potential dif­
ficulties calmly together with his lover, he panicked. This, in turn, provided evi­
dence suitable to maintain his doubts as to who he is. At time of interview, he 




























































































consequence of having HTV. This is to say, Giulio is not always sure whether the 
lack of guts which has been manifest in his conduct over the past eight years re­
flects his true character. At times, he thinks that his tendency to blame his poor 
quality of life on the virus may just be an excuse for his own failings: "because, 
fundamentally, in terms o f my character, /  may (have been) much more similar to 
how I  am now when I was 20 years old". In other words: the juxtaposition of two 
subperiods of his life may be an ex-post construct which inappropriately locates 
in HTV the responsibility for the change of his character. At bottom, he may 
really be, and have been in the past, far less brave and outgoing than he now 
pleases to think. After making this remark, Giulio volunteers:
"But I  say to myself: 'sure. But then, fundamentally, the way I  am, as a person 
I  don’t like m yself I  don't like myself that way, you see? Whether /  have been 
conditioned by seropositivity, or else I  am really like that, it's real bad, you 
see, because I  don’t like myself as a person that way (...). But anyway, no, I 
think that I am influenced a lot by this [i.e., seropositivity]. I  think that if(...) 
some product [some medical drug] should come up which would make me turn 
alive again, I  don't know, I  have eight years o f my life - lost, to resume really. 
I  mean, it's like turning back by eight years, you see? Because I  feel it, I  feel it, 
within is repressed my true personality."
The contrast between the two subperiods of his life which he sees as distin­
guished by diagnosis is related, by Giulio himself, to a contrast of character. Be­
fore, he used to be easy-going and sociable - as he said in the initial part of the 
interview, he did not let himself get tangled up heavily in daily problems, but 
handled them in a matter-of-fact way. After, the record coherently points to the 
plain contrary. The contrast between before and after is framed not just in terms 
of the existence or gravity of problems to face, but in terms of the way in which it 
is characteristic for him, Giulio, to face problems. The way in which he used to 
strive towards a future thought of as open and promising is assumed as a self-de­




























































































that invalidation has been confirmed over again throughout the past eight years 
because it was not a reliable point of reference for the structuration of conduct 
any longer. Yet its opposite, the weak, timid, and unenergetic self the image of 
which emerges from the way Giulio did behave over all these years, is not ac­
ceptable to him as his true self. Giulio oscillates between old and new: incapable 
of bringing about a decision (i.e., to either connect back to his old self or to stop 
blaming himself for failing the standards set by it), he protracts his crisis.
While it is impossible to identify a set of conditions which would necessarily 
bring about a pattern of experience similar to the one just illustrated, I shall point 
out a few features which, on comparison between Giulio's case and the reports of 
other respondents who constructed their self in terms of "invalidation", strike as 
remarkable. Firstly, there is no necessary relation between the feedback obtained 
to early acts of disclosure, on one hand, and the ease with which the crisis of di­
agnosis and the concurrent crisis of the "diagnosis of the self' are overcome, on 
the other. This is not to say that social support does not matter. Yet, it seems im­
portant to caution against the assumption that individuals interpret events neces­
sarily by adopting the social constructs which are most promptly suggested by 
relevant others. If this were the whole story, Giulio would have retrieved his old 
"devil-may-care" self on learning of his then-partner's reaction back in the period 
following closely to his own diagnosis. The "diagnosis of self' may escalate into 
a biographical turning point even if relevant others do all they can in order not to 
undermine the individual's taken-for-granted assumptions about self (compare 
Charmaz 1991: 209). Indeed, as Charmaz (1991: 227) writes with reference to 
the work of G.H.Mead, the "effects of a past event can reach far beyond what 
other participants have ever intended. The shaping of the self continues in the 
mind of the man or woman who relives, and re-evaluates, the earlier event" in the 




























































































ing to one of the groups which were hit hardest by the HIV-pandemic does not 
necessarily prevent the individual from experiencing positivity as a personal cri­
sis - a crisis of identity which may keep them for many years from disclosing 
their serostatus specifically to the other who is, by means of some mental con­
nection, associated to the onset of that crisis. Thirdly, then, disclosure of serosta­
tus, and fear thereof, may be tied up intimately with the crisis of identity which 
was first triggered off by the diagnosis of HIV - a crisis which may be unrelated 
to the fear of stigma on moral grounds which is usually deemed responsible for 
the HIV-positives' unease within their social environment.
Reinforcement
"Sure" (and ask you for a mo) "Yes, also because there's a metamorphosis, 
with HIV" (That's what happened to you?) "A double one, in the sense that 
there's been the first metamorphosis in the moment in which I have come to 
know it, and the second one in the moment in which I have reacted, in the 
sense that anyway, when you are told to be seropositive, you enter into a 
sphere completely different from the one which belonged to me, which is why I 
started to live in neglect o f HIV-AIDS, and so forth and so forth. Hence, si­
lence, loneliness, depression, and so on and so on. Last September, after also 
concluding an intimate relationship, I  said 'that's enough, now I  am going to 
live again!', that's to say, seropositivity yes or no, I  don’t care. I  should begin 
by mentioning that I do not have a past as a drug-addict, I do not have a past 
as a prostitute, and so on and so on. [I come from a] Most normal family, ba­
sically [my main activity was that] I  studied, after finishing school I  have met 
this, a guy in the gym, which anyway means a healthy environment. (...)"
Veronica did not even let me finish my initial question: off she went with a 
flood of words (which continues for several more pages of transcript). There is 




























































































respondents which would match her juxtaposition of periods in clarity. The sec­
ond of those periods, spanning from diagnosis to the moment when she reacted, 
closely resembles what I have analyzed above as "invalidation" - except that it is 
a stage now overcome. In the case of Veronica, post-diagnosis life breaks in turn 
down in two distinct phases. The second of these, which extends to the time of 
interview, constitutes a return to her pre-diagnosis past in important ways: Ve­
ronica has started to live again. Just as with Giulio, the period following directly 
to diagnosis was experienced as plainly opposed to life.
In her case, though, moral considerations played a constitutive part for the dis­
ruptive effect of diagnosis: the sphere into which she was thrown by diagnosis 
did not belong to her, because she stemmed from a normal and healthy social 
background (note the transition from the unpersonal use of the second person to 
the first person singular in the above quote). In short: she thought of herself as 
different from the people whom she associated with HIV/AIDS. Who could have 
thought that the acquaintance she had made in the gym, and with whom she had 
started a loving relationship, had been injecting drugs in the past, thus getting 
infected with HIV and in turn infecting her? It is this relationship which she men­
tions as having come to an end "in September", i.e. roughly six months before the 
interview. Throughout the months preceding that separation, she had cared for 
her boy-friend: he had come to develop manifest AIDS. Veronica was thus kept 
from an active social life partly out of consideration for his needs; partly, her re­
strained level of social activities was due to her shame of having contracted a 
condition which she herself, prior to her own infection, had associated with the 
scum of society. The crisis of identity triggered off by diagnosis has a major 
component related to the difference between the moral image of the groups most 
affected by HIV, on one hand, and Veronica's clean and sober middle-class back­
ground, on the other. This contrast is not an abstract one: it extends to Veronica's 
way of thinking her self. The clash between the image of deviance and decay, on 




























































































sis, on the other, gives rise to a double "metamorphosis" - to a loss first, and the 
retrieval later, of her sense of identity. Prior to diagnosis, her conception and 
style of life were rather upstart: despite having just left school, she worked hard 
to enjoy an above-average standard of life. Correspondingly, she held a specific 
view of herself - a view which she has now resumed:
"I am not a person who is easily satisfied; I always want to arrive at the top; I 
am ambitious. And, you know, initially seropositivity meant to me like: 'babe, 
up to now you've been dreaming, forget all those healthy - your ambitions, 
your aspirations and get your feet down to the floor. That is, you're like that 
now; tomorrow you'll be diseased and moribund in the hospital'. That's how I 
first thought about it; that's why I  fought against it."
Veronica's double metamorphosis can hence be understood as a shift away 
from and back towards her old description of self as upstart and ambitious; the 
devastating effect of diagnosis was due to her understanding of HIV as sharply 
contradicting that self-image both in terms of morality and life-expectancy. 
Throughout the roughly three years of neglect and depression, Veronica did not 
have a valid self-description any more by means of which she may have struc­
tured her conduct: the association of deviance and decay to her medical condition 
had suspended the validity of her old self, while failing to supply an acceptable 
substitute. To be "alive", for Veronica, means to live similar to the way in which 
she used to live prior to diagnosis; to have now, even despite HIV, retrieved the 
connection to the way in which she used to live means to have strengthened the 
belief that she, as a person, is distinguished by the literally vital aspects of her 
self which had characterized her before diagnosis - all the more so since, as she 
recounts, many people with HIV just use that condition as a pretext for abandon­
ing themselves to self-pity and passivity.
In contrast, Veronica's reaction was triggered by "the wish to still believe in my 




























































































inside, which I  had repressed for three years, my self." Rather than just reporting 
to have resumed old projects, she reports to have resumed her old self - a self 
which was distinguished (by its quality of nurturing and pursuing high-flying 
ambitions) both from her old mates and, all the more so, by the bunch of fellow- 
PHIVs who do not even try to control their lives. This does not mean that Veron­
ica thinks of herself as exactly the same as before: "there have been a lot of 
changes", she says, due partly to the difficult experience of HIV, and partly to 
the fact that she is in the process of growing older anyway. Still, "there were a lot 
o f connections relative to the first 20 years" of her life. There is a sort of conti­
nuity between the period prior to diagnosis, on one hand, and the period after the 
second metamorphosis, on the other; the period in between the two does not 
make part of her self, except for having taught her a lot about her true goals and 
desires.
Among all my respondents, Veronica was the one who most clearly articulated 
moral concerns as a major component of the crisis triggered by diagnosis. Veron­
ica's case shows how well moral stigma, on one hand, and the shock of having 
one's life-expectancy cut sharply, on the other, may go hand in hand in disrupting 
a vital self-definition which had previously been taken-for-granted. Veronica's 
ambitious self was invalidated both by the image of impending death and by the 
image of moral sloppiness which she attached to her medical condition- until she 
resolved to retrieve her old self despite o f those images. This very resolution, 
which found its practical expression in the decision to break her silence and start 
disclosing her condition to friends and acquaintances, constitutes the basis for her 
biography to be constructed as a reinforcement: the pursuit of her ambitions face- 
to-face the perils posed by HIV is all the more distinctive.
When comparing Veronica's case to the other respondents who reported to 




























































































tation and loss, she stands out as quite particular in most other cases, passage 
from crisis to a new sense of normalcy came about with the help of a shared 
sense of belonging to one of the groups most affected with HIV, namely the gay 
community. A first observation to stress from a comparative point of view thus 
regards the relevance of group membership for the integration of the event of di­
agnosis into one's biography (compare Carricaburu/Pierret 1995). Most of the 
respondents who constructed their selves in terms of biographical reinforcement 
had established contact with a support association for the HIV-positive quickly 
after diagnosis - sometimes in a matter of days. Not coincidentally, all of those 
who reacted so quickly were gay men: access to support groups for people with 
HTV is greatly facilitated by a shared sense of belonging other than HIV. Given 
that, especially throughout the pandemic's first decade, most such groups were 
promoted by the gay community, this clearly helped members of this particular 
population as against other people struck by the virus.
Secondly, the beneficial effects of a shared sense of belonging are likely to 
continue in that the conceptual tools offered within such groups can more readily 
be adopted if there is a fit between key elements of one's previous sense of iden­
tity, on one hand, and the identity of the group with regard to which those con­
ceptual tools have been elaborated, on the other. The possibility of interpreting 
one's personal history within the framework of a broader collective history can be 
highly reassuring. Thirdly, though, there is a potential hitch to such adoptions of 
collective interpretations for the resolution of one's crisis of identity: those inter­
pretations may simply not quite fit the problem which they are used to resolve. 
On close interpretation, several of my interviews turned out to reveal consider­
able inconsistencies between proclamations such as the continuity of life despite 
HTV or the manageability of the condition in result of a proper frame of mind, on 
one hand, and the respective interviewees' ability to argue and elaborate on those 
points with reference to their own experience, on the other. In extreme cases, 




























































































which the individual had been plunged by diagnosis, on one hand, and the con­
ceptual tool kit used to fix that problem, on the other. The self-description which 
an individual adopts in harmony with the collective interpretations taught within 
a self-help group or support association may simply not relate to the doubt about 
his or her identity which was initially raised by the news of diagnosis.
Fourth and finally, then, Veronica's case is indeed exemplary in what regards 
the irreducible character of the individual's decisions and actions relative to the 
input of relevant others. Veronica resolved to dare disclosure towards her friends 
even though she had experienced heavy blame for having caught HIV on the part 
of her parents. Once more, this is not to say that social reactions do not matter 
one respondent who had faced the most outrageous stigmatization by her husband 
had come to see herself as literally contagious, and gratefully noticed my lack of 
concern when accepting her offer of a tea, to be taken from the sort of cups she 
also uses. Yet, the interpretation of HIV which is currently most renowned 
among social scientists misses out on the crucial consequences specifically of the 
event of diagnosis. True enough: "There is a collective dimension to HlV-infec- 
tion that shapes the individual's experience" (Carricaburu/Pierret 1995: 71). But 
how does such shaping come about? I believe that individual experience is irre­
ducible to the social categories by means of which it takes shape. While the asso­
ciation of HIV to moral deviancy and imminent death definitely is a social con­
struct, the repercussions of those associations at the level of self can not be pre­
dicted in a general way. What HIV's infectivity and potentially lethal effects 
mean to the individual on the basis of his or her personal history can not be prop­






























































































"You know, I  have perceived a very gradual transition. That means for me 
HIV, the diagnosis o f HIV, has not been a turning point in my life. I f  I think 
about before, the main difference, but it's a very fuzzy 'before' really, a 'before' 
which is not necessarily prior to that date, the main difference, in my view, is 
the, the major or minor consciousness o f a problem. 'Before', relative to HIV, 
'before' to me has this meaning - it does not mean major happiness or thought­
lessness, i f  you know what I want to say. Because, as I  told you, for me it's all 
been very, very gradual. I  have needed a lot o f time to understand what it was. 
That's to say, the moment in which they told me as such has not been a signifi­
cant or important moment."
The two patterns of biographical self-construction which I have discussed thus 
far, "invalidation" and "reinforcement", add up to something like the standard 
process of self-constitution as mortal. It is important to caution immediately 
against the possible wrong implication that there be anything like a necessity of 
transition from one to the other here: some people may get stuck in invalidation 
without ever overcoming that pattern. That said, though, the adoption of a dy­
namic interpretative perspective to the one-shot interviews which I conducted 
enables us to perceive the pattern of invalidation as a stage within the process of 
self-constitution as mortal: to all those who have recounted their biography in 
terms of reinforcement, diagnosis had set off an initial crisis of variable length 
which, as is clearly discernible from the remarks made on that period by the re­
spective interviewees, would have been recounted in terms of "invalidation" at 
that time. For representatives of both patterns, the moment of diagnosis consti­
tutes a crucial life event around which thoughts and actions have come to be cen­
tered for months or even years.
In contrast, there are biographical self-constructions in which the moment of 




























































































this was true for a few of my interviewees only, these can in turn be subdivided 
in two groups: respondents who report not to have experienced diagnosis as a 
particularly meaningful moment at all, and respondents who do not attribute the 
status of a biographical turning-point to diagnosis albeit recounting to have expe­
rienced it as a shock at that time. While interesting questions are raised by the 
second of these subtypes as well, I will concentrate on the first one in accord 
with my policy of discussing the most extreme case within each pattern. Sergio's 
case is indeed extreme: as he relates subsequently to the above quote, he does not 
even recollect well the situation in which he was told about his positivity. This is 
all the more surprising since Sergio's diagnosis occurred as early as technically 
possible (i.e., right after the virus had been identified and means for its detection 
from blood samples developed): "/ think it was in [the year 19]83". As is well 
known, this was a time when this odd new condition was associated to almost 
imminent death: as Sergio recalls, shortly before being diagnosed, he had read a 
newspaper article on deaths among the gay community in San Francisco. How 
come that Sergio, who was just 23 years old then, did not experience a shock 
when being confronted with a news which seemed to imply his own imminent 
death?
Having had life-long experience with managing another chronic and highly un­
foreseeable condition, namely haemophilia, Sergio was used to face trouble when 
it arised - rather than when first learning such trouble may arise. Differently from 
the various episodes of hepatitis which he had experienced in the past, "to have 
come in contact with that thing [the virus which would later be called HIV] had 
not caused me any harm for the moment, you see, it was something which did not 
cause me anything, right?" Given that his experience of haemophilia had taught 
him to base judgements on his state of health primarily on his own observations, 
rather than on statements by his doctors (indeed, Sergio has learned to acutely 
observe medical staff with a view to its level of expertise, concluding that it often 




























































































provoke his death any time soon. Until further notice, Sergio would not feel 
threatened.
Such notice arrived years later, when his T4-cell count fell quickly for an ex­
tended period of time, dropping below a level which he had defined as critical. 
Sergio figured that, if this process continued at the same speed, he would be left 
virtually without an immune system before long. "This is when I  started to feel 
dreaded in a systematic way" - for the first time in his life, Sergio recounts, he 
was most intensely concerned with his health and survival in the absence of what 
he would classify as a concrete somatic problem. This was a shock to him: he had 
not thought of himself as being susceptible to such feelings. Together with his 
health, what became threatened was his self-description as sufficiently rational a 
being not to ever succumb to dread.
Now, as a result of a detailed case-interpretation which can not be fully pre­
sented here, I believe that it is because of Sergio's ability to rather quickly resort 
to an updated form of that old self-description that he did not construct his biog­
raphy around the marker event of this episode of dread. Indeed, Sergio reports 
that he managed to maintain a distinctive style in handling that dread - distinctive 
in particular as compared to the dread of his ex-girlfriend (who had caught the 
virus from him). As is evident not only from Sergio's narration, but also from the 
interview which I conducted with his ex-girlfriend, she had intensely feared, and 
expected, the worst possible outcome from the very moment of first suspecting 
that she may be infected; she had hence worked herself into a state of constant 
terror about her prospective physical decay and loss of control. Sergio had tried 
to contrast that attitude from the start - with rather negative consequences for the 
relationship (she felt ill understood in her concerns). Yet that attitude and the 
concurrent self-definition helped Sergio to quickly gain composure when himself 
coming to intensely dread an event which had not yet manifested itself: "/ knew 




























































































his girlfriend tended to abandon herself to her dread, he kept on making observa­
tions as to the circumstances and effects of that dread, and continued to contrast 
it with the thought that, after all, it may be exaggerated or plainly pointless. At 
time of interview, Sergio thinks he is "immune against that sort o f dread". "/ am 
not a hypochondriac". Rather than having come to feel more vulnerable by nega­
tive feelings than he was prior to his attack of dread, he sees himself as further 
strengthened.
Beyond the specific features of this personal case, Sergio's story is instructive 
in two important respects. Firstly, background experiences shape the perception 
of diagnosis decisively. This is not to imply, of course, that every person with 
haemophilia who comes to be diagnosed with HIV reacts the way Sergio did. 
Yet, the very qualification of diagnosis as an event constitutes an assessment 
made by the individual on the basis of a series of assumptions. The experience of 
diagnosis as a disruptive event is predicted mainly by the following two factors: 
(a) to have previously taken an extended future dimension of conduct and self for 
granted, and (b) not to have, in the past, developed skills as to the management of 
high degrees of uncertainty with regard to one's future. Haemophilia is a back­
ground experience which may make a difference in both respects. Secondly, self­
construction in terms of continuity seems to bear a high degree of affinity with an 
in turn continuous pattern of communication of and about HTV. While a cleavage 
between early and late acts of disclosure could be observed in a great many re­
spondents from other patterns, Sergio made efforts at turning his condition into a 
topic of conversation with remarkable vigour - despite of the rather discouraging 
reactions he obtained: by and large, the responses to his disclosures were mani­
festations of either (alleged) indifference or panic. Again, it seems fair to remark 
that specific patterns of biographical self-construction as seropositive can not be 




























































































with HTV; rather, the individuals readiness to expose her- or himself to the risk of 
obtaining discouraging or even clearly negative reactions seems to be related to 
the state of biographical self-construction.
Void
"That means, my life before, that means it was really regardless, you see? 
That means I  now succeed in understanding that, I never accepted any respon­
sibility, you see? That means I always did what I  enjoyed, really in the sense o f 
what gave me pleasure, and - first, there was me, and then there were the oth­
ers, you see? That means, I  don't quite understand what you mean by 'my 
life'."
This is not the very first answer given by Paola in the course of the interview: 
it is her response to my effort at relaunching the initial question. My first attempt 
at learning about her life before diagnosis got stuck: Paola responded to it by re­
counting a series of instances in which she said she felt restrained now as com­
pared to previously. Given that I had, prior to the interview, had occasion to ob­
serve Paola's ability for staging a show (during the session of the support group 
for seropositives at which I described my research and asked for co-operation, 
she was at the center of attention: after hours of seek-and-hide, she finally admit­
ted to having recently relapsed into an episode of intravenous drug-use), I had a 
heightened sense of the possibility that she may be trying to foster an impression 
on me. From the very beginning of the interview, I thus felt I had to be particu­
larly careful not to be fobbed off with a version of events which Paola had cho­
sen to present to me, rather than with a honest account of her thoughts. And in­
deed: the series of instances with which she illustrated her general remark that 
her life had become much more restrained after diagnosis sounded shallow to me. 
The risk of causing harm to her health by walking the street with wet hair did not 




























































































restrict herself to jobs which would not require sustained physical effort did not 
appear plausible as a deeply felt concern (in the course of the hide-and-seek at 
the support group, it had become evident that she did not enjoy working at all, 
not to mention hard physical work); when naming disclosure of serostatus as a 
third area of concern, she limited herself to generalities which appeared not to 
connect to her personal experience.7
7 In order for the reader to be able to judge whether this "hermeneutics of suspicion" 
seems mislead, I wish to document the sequence preceding the above quote:
"... How was my life before?" (Yes) "coming to know about my seropositivity?" 
(Exactly) 'It was more unrestrained." (In which way?) "It was - that means, it was not 
tied down, that means it's more restrained now. That means, you are, I am much more 
limited now than before." (Can you extend on that? In which sense were you more 
unrestrained? In which sense are you limited?) "That means, more unrestrained because 
I did not have this concern as to what you can do, right? Be it in physical terms, be it 
mentally, you see? That means ... that means also with regard to the most banal things, 
you see? That means I did n o t... I mean perhaps I now say something stupid, right?, but 
what before may have been a lack of attention may cause real harm now, you see?" (You 
mean with regard to sexuality, for example?) "No, I am referring also - to lack of care, 
you see? When it rains, I do not use an umbrella (laughs), before that was a lack of care, 
because I got wet. Now it may spell real trouble because I may catch something, you 
see?" (That means, you have to pay more attention to certain things.) 'Then also, 
something more serious, with regard to work. You are limited because you have to do - 
that means I have to do work which would not be too demanding physically." (But is 
that a serious limitation for you?) "Yes, I feel that's a serious limitation. Also, I don't 
know, the examples I make are most... when you know somebody (...), the problem: do 
I stage a show? Do I tell, or don't I? Will I be accepted, or won't I? You see? It also 
depends on, well, how you are. I for example am ... very sensitive, you see? That means 
... I do not like to, to hide myself, you see? But at the same time, - that means, it's not 




























































































The information which I had obtained when contacting the support-group to 
which Paola belonged had thus assumed relevance for the interview situation. Yet 
that prior contact did not bring about one-way information only: when being in­
terviewed, Paola knew that I already knew about her past as a drug-user. While 
some feet-dragging before "confessing" that past to me makes for an obvious rea­
son for her to respond in a somewhat evasive way to my initial question regard­
ing her past life, it is hence fair to suppose that there be another dimension to her 
way of acting. Right after having said that she does not know what I mean when 
asking for "her life", Paola will recount that her past life was the classic history 
of a drug-addict. This may potentially reinforce the impression that she just 
needed to buy some time before voicing a statement which to make cost her a lot. 
But there is a second interpretation - an interpretation which takes Paola's words 
literally. Having spent most of her youth with activities related to the purchase 
and use of drugs, Paola may indeed not have been too sure as to what character­
ized her life - and what characterized her as a person. Indeed, on the basis of the 
accounts of Paola and several other former drug-users among my respondents, I 
believe that the "classic history o f a drug-addict" results, at the level of self-de­
scription, in an almost complete deprivation of self: in the absence of distinctive 
self-definitions which may help structure conduct. I will briefly illustrate this 
interpretation with a view to Paola, to then have a look at other respondents.
In the case of Paola just as in several others, the diagnosis of seropositivity did 
not trigger a change of habits: "/ lived as if  nothing had happened'. After diag­
nosis just as previously, daily life was centered around buying, selling and taking
relative, right? What matters is that in your mind you feel this obligation to tell, not to 
tell, you see?" (Is that a constant aspect of your life now?) 'Yes." (Let’s take a step 
back, and then we'll talk about that a bit more. Tell me a bit about what your life before 




























































































drugs. Paola was diagnosed about six years before the interview at the age of 23; 
according to her own indications, she had been injecting drugs since she was 16 
years old, and had continued to do so on a regular basis until 18 months before 
the interview. Similar to most of the respondents who had become infected by 
intravenous drug-use, the knowledge of being seropositive did not induce her to 
stop injecting. When taking one of those periodical breaks from drug-use which 
she compares to the temporary breaks from daily life taken by ordinary people 
with the declared purpose of resuming it ("to stop [injecting] is for a drug-addict 
a bit like taking a vacation for a worker"), she perceived the need for a lasting 
change ("i f  /  had resumed [injecting] again, I would not have stopped any 
more"). But differently from ordinary people who may, on thinking about their 
daily lives during the holidays, consider the case for change, when looking back 
at her past as a drug-user, Paola did not find any anchorage point which would 
have helped her to reorganize her life: "when you take away the heroin from your 
life a huge hole is left in your soul - a hole so huge that you don't know how to 
fill it." Initially, her emerging awareness of being HIV-positive only added to that 
desperation. Not only did she feel to have simply wasted most of her past life: her 
medical condition made a normal existence look impossible in the future as well. 
Only when joining a support-group a few months before the interview, Paola 
started to deal more intensely with her condition. In particular, she started think­
ing more intensely about herself: the group made her notice aspects of her char­
acter of which she had not been fully aware previously. This interaction with the 
support group turned out to be highly ambivalent, because the aspects of self 
which were thus made evident, especially Paola's ruthless egoism, were valued 
negatively by the other group members. While helping her to know herself, the 
group insisted that she should change.
Now, Paola's reaction to this ambivalence highlights the dramatic character of 
the void of self which she had experienced - and. which to fill was her main con­




























































































while rejecting the expectation that she would have to change which resulted 
from the negative valuation of that quality. "/ feel it's not necessary for one to 
change: what really matters is that you know how you are" - it is actually by de­
fying her peers' expectation at improving her self that Paola manages to 
strengthen the status of egoism as a distinctive aspect of her character. If we re­
read the opening quote of this section in the light of this interpretation, it be­
comes evident that her "me first"-attitude is indeed the only way in which she can 
qualify her way of life - and that this understanding of herself has emerged with 
some degree of clarity only now. In her desperate need of establishing some sort 
self-identification at all, Paola sticks to the first candidate on offer - consistent 
with that attribute of self, without much caring about the reactions of others.
On the first sight, the above interpretation may seem far-fetched. Yet Paola's 
remarks on the void left by her habit of injecting drugs are echoed by several of 
the other five respondents who were infected by shared needles. Given that intra­
venous drug-use had dominated all of the respective individuals' youth and early 
adulthood, the emerging awareness of being threatened by premature death cast 
its shadow back on the past in a very specific way. Daily life, Vladimiro recounts 
"war centered around the drug", which is why that period is now thought of as "a 
life thrown away". The one thing Orsola has retained as a valid feature of her life 
with the drug is that she has come to know what she "want[s] to flee". When 
learning about her serostatus at the age of 26, Alessandra was dreaded not only 
by the thought "of dying, o f leaving everything, of not having time any more to do 
anything", but also by the thought "of never having done anything, [which is] 
even worse”: "at that time[while injecting heroin], I was only that, at that time 
the one existing thing was that (...), I  was only that, I  did not know myself other­
wise than in that” (Alessandra). The awareness of being HIV-positive further re­
inforces the existential desperation which may result from prolonged drug-abuse 
especially throughout adolescence. As a result, intravenous drug-users are par­




























































































from many gay men, the pattern of behaviour which has led to the transmission 
of HTV is usually not sheltered against bitter self-reproaches by relating to a rele­
vant aspect of one's present sense of identity.
Not all of the ex-users among my respondents constructed their biographies in 
terms of void, though: this is actually the case only with two of them, namely 
Alessandra and Paola. In one other case (Orsola), intense indoctrination with the 
rhetoric of self-actualization had resulted in a narrative in terms of exemplary 
adaptation; only below the surface of that official success-story could I discern 
the desperation of a woman who still felt to be at loss of herself while knowing 
she would soon die. In two other cases (among which we find Vladimiro), the 
narrative was established in terms of continuity: little or nothing was reported to 
have changed by the respective respondents, who had both established everyday 
routines not reducible to drug-use (family life in the one and a rewarding profes­
sional activity in the other case) before discontinuing that habit and thus becom­
ing aware of their serostatus as entailing a problem. Finally, one respondent re­
counted her life in terms of reinforcement: after first having been intensely 
shocked especially by the risk that her new-born child may have caught the virus, 
too, this woman then resumed control of her life precisely with a view to her 
quality as a mother - a mother who, given that she bore responsibility for having 
to leave her child a semi-orphan some time in the future, was ready to sacrifice 
herself entirely, until the end, for the well-being of her child. In short, even 
though a retrospective assessment of the period of drug-abuse as having left a 
huge void is a rather general feature of ex-users, a self-construction according to 
the pattern void will be established only if no events or activities have emerged 
(either before diagnosis or from the time of diagnosis to the moment in which 
drug-use has been discontinued, and the knowledge of being HTV-positive thus 
reached awareness) which would fill that blank. One last remark: differently from 
other patterns discussed above, the social environment seems to play a vital role 




























































































the identification of aspects of self which may help them to organize a life with­
out the drug.
Switch
"(...) I really started to panic. A panic which lasted for a few days. Then, in re­
sponse to the pushes from my brother who scolded me, who tried to, to shake 
me up, at some point there really was the release. The release in the sense 
that, I  really had the feeling, when this thing started to change aspect, that is 
to say - 1 started to change. I  had the feeling as i f  I, until, during that period 
there, had been leaving like in a bubble. That's to say, apart from everything 
and everybody - that's to say, I observed [what was going on], but did not do 
anything to improve my situation. (\\\) At some point, this thing came apart, 
that's to say, I really had the feeling that this, this wrapping had broken apart, 
and I  slowly turned, let's say, I again started to become normal again, in the 
sense that, I managed to talk more, right?, I managed to pour my heart out, I 
managed, /  succeeded in listening to what they told me. (\\\) This is a bit let's 
say the experience o f before and after, because now, for example, even if  usu­
ally, you know, the character does not change in just one moment, but yes, it's 
much easier for me to talk to other people."
The episode recounted by Francesco here did not follow immediately to his 
diagnosis, but happened roughly ten months later in the course of a medical prob­
lem which made him dread he may be about to die. Francesco had been diag­
nosed roughly a year before the interview at the age of 46; as further bloodwork 
soon revealed, his T4-count was already down to almost zero. The first months 
after diagnosis were characterized by a continuous health emergency (including a 
hospitalization for pneumonia); yet differently from the episode recounted above, 
Francesco never thought he may be close to death. That thought occurred to him 




























































































ing the fungal infection which kept him from eating sufficiently. Given that he 
had already lost dramatically much weight throughout the preceding crises, 
Francesco got seriously scared. The above set of quotes stems from a section a 
few minutes after the start of the interview in which Francesco's account of the 
difference between "before" and "after" culminates in the conclusion that he is 
much more ready now to open up towards his social environment than he used to 
be. Similarly, a bit further on, he states:
"There really was a turning point, yes ... Really a remarkable change, as I  told 
you, as compared to how I was before, in short. And I  am doing much better, 
because I  am much calmer, more relaxed, you see, don't - that's to say, almost 
everything changed that's to say all the - everything changed, in short, it 
changed for the better, I  have to say."
Strikingly, this contrast applies not only to the distinction between the period 
of acute crisis, on one hand, and the situation at time of interview, on the other: it 
refers to the interview's initial prompt, namely the invitation to talk about the pe­
riod before diagnosis as opposed to the present. Francesco's incapability of com­
municating effectively at the height of his episode of dread was just the culmina­
tion of an incapability which had characterized him for decades:
"(...) before, if  I  was not - grilled, let’s say, i f  there was not somebody who 
asked me questions, who made me, who" (You did not start on your own initia­
tive?) "I did not start [talking]. Now, in contrast, I manage more easily, more 
- that's to say, to express what I  carry within mys—, I  manage more easily, be­
fore not, absolutely. There really was a need o f a person who would pose me 
precise questions. (\\\) You see? There's always been this ... this handicap 
[English in the original] (...) even when I was a boy, when I was 17, 18, 20 
years old (...)."
Francesco is the only one among my respondents to construct his biography in 




























































































very special indeed in many other respects as well, thus setting him somewhat 
apart from the rest of my interviewees. For a start, shortly after learning about his 
positive serostatus, he was confronted with the even worse news that he had al­
ready reached an advanced stage of AIDS. Secondly, this news reached him at a 
rather mature age (the second highest among all my respondents): when under­
standing that his lifetime may be about to expire, Francesco had lived for about 
two decades more than most respondents at time of diagnosis had done. Differ­
ently from the many young adults in my group of interviewees, his character can 
thus be assumed to have already been stably formed. The sudden change of self 
reported by Francesco is thus all the more surprising; it can hardly be explained 
without taking into consideration, thirdly, that the aspect of self with regard to 
which that change came about had previously been valued negatively by 
Francesco (it had long constituted a "handicap", as it were), and fourth, that his 
brother intervened in a highly remarkable way. When talking aside the panic- 
stricken patient's bed, the brother posed the alternative most clearly: either 
Francesco would react - or he should indeed get ready for the "passage", as he 
put it.
Once the situation was framed this way, it was impossible to go on living the 
way Francesco had used to live. We as second-order observers may be struck by 
the fact that he attaches the label of a handicap to his old s e lf , rather than to his 
condition of severe immunosuppression; we may engage into remarks as to the 
deceptive nature of the alleged secondary gains by means of which individuals 
manage to accept a decrease of quality of life by finding some positive aspect in 
it. The point which I would like to make with regard to Francesco's account is 
more simple: biographical constructions in terms of a sudden switch of self are 
one among the options potentially available to persons with HTV or AIDS. I am 




























































































Francesco with regard to his self. As we will see right now, Francesco's way of 





























































































Awareness of finitude and its effects
Above, I have distinguished five patterns of biographical self-construction with a 
view to the status of the diagnosis of HTV or AIDS. Across that variety of pat­
terns, the knowledge of being HIV-positive has turned out to be tied to specific 
aspects of self. In each of the exemplary cases which I discussed in some detail, 
the awareness of one's own mortality has become connected to a particular fea­
ture of self. Thus, Francesco recounts that the intense dread of death which he 
experienced at the height of a medical crisis brought about a sudden switch of 
self with regard to communicative openness. Paola was at a loss of any distinc­
tive feature of self capable of filling the void left by a decade of drug-abuse - un­
til peers suggested an aspect, namely egoism, which she gratefully accepted as 
her self-definition. The continuity of Sergio's self relies specifically on his self­
observation as being able of handling any sort of fears, including the fears poten­
tially evoked by HIV disease, in a rational, matter-of-fact manner.
The three patterns mentioned thus far are all somewhat special - in all of these 
three variations, my general interpretative model of "diagnosis of se lf' has served 
as a means of contrast against which the specificity of each particular pattern has 
emerged more clearly. The patterns of "invalidation" and "reinforcement", in con­
trast, can be seen as the consecutive stages of what may be called the standard 
process of self-constitution as mortal - except that some individuals get stuck in 
the first of those stages for extended periods of time in an apparently irremedi­
able way. Because diagnosis of HTV had caused Giulio to lose faith in his previ­
ously uncontested conviction to be able of handling any difficulty of life with 
ease, he indeed got more and more trapped by difficulties: the invalidation of his 
old self lasted on and on. This need not be: the retrieval of her old self-definition 
as an extraordinarily ambitious person helped Veronica to break the ban of a vi­




























































































In all of these five exemplary cases, the utterly personal attribute which has 
assumed particular relevance for the construction of self does not, as such, carry 
general interest. Who cares whether Sergio constructs the continuity of his self 
with regard to fearlessness or, say, polygamy? Nor is it surprising to note that 
those attributes bear a close relation to the knowledge of seropositivity, and spe­
cifically to the time when that knowledge was first communicated to the respec­
tive individual - after all, consistent with my research strategy, the patterns of 
self-construction are established with a view to the difference potentially made 
by the diagnosis of HTV. Observations which can claim general sociological in­
terest start right here, though.8 First, beyond the particular articulation in individ­
ual cases, it seems noteworthy that the knowledge of HIV-positivity typically 
affects a specific aspect of self, rather than exerting its impact indiscriminately on 
all of the assumptions previously held on oneself. Second, the particular features 
of self which bear crucial relevance for the biographical self-constructions of my 
exemplary cases were singled out by the respective respondents themselves ex­
pressly as self-descriptions. This implies that the process of self-constitution as 
mortal is intrinsically connected to the establishment of a reliable self-definition. 
The question to which I would now like to turn hence regards my respondents' 
explicit assessment of the effects of the thought of death on their self.
Before diagnosis, the thought of their own mortality was not relevant for the 
way in which my respondents thought about themselves. The strong awareness of 
their own finitude which was triggered by diagnosis thus added a dimension to 
these individuals' self-reflections which had previously been absent. If the diag­
nosis of HTV would not have come about in that particular period of life, and if
8 I shall consider the relationship between biographical self-construction and disclosure 





























































































the intense thought of death would thus have forced its way into consciousness at 
a different point in time, its effects on the affected individual's sense of identity 
would or, to say the least, could have been different. If the test would have turned 
out HIV-negative, all of one's life may have taken a different turn. In short, the 
repercussions of diagnosis on the self may retrospectively be observed as contin­
gent by the very persons affected. This means that my respondents' retrospective 
reflections regarding the effects of diagnosis on one's life and self are in turn ob­
servable, by us second-order observers, with respect to the relationship between 
self-knowledge and self-transformation.
Any observation which a human being may make regarding her or his self is 
self-cognitive - including the statement "I have changed". That said, though, it is 
important to distinguish between two fundamentally different ways in which ob­
servations on the self can be made. Firstly, the self may be conceived as having 
been decisively shaped by a specific event or experience - such as in the state­
ment "I have changed" (as a result of X). Alternatively, the self may be conceived 
as existing independently of any particular experience: whatever circumstances 
may come to alter one's idea about oneself, those modifications are conceived as 
revealing aspects of the self which had previously gone unnoticed, but which 
were nevertheless present already. This second approach is handily evident from 
statements such as "I discovered myself' (as a result of X). While in the first ap­
proach, the cognitive dimension is implied by and subordinate to the transforma­
tive dimension, the opposite is the case with the second approach: changes of self 
are here implied by and subordinate to the enhancement of self-cognition. By the 
same token, the character of a life-event which is conceived as having helped 
bring about that enhancement of self-knowledge is not framed as decisive in the 
sense in which an event conceived as having brought about a change of self can 
be termed crucial. The very semantics of self-discovery implies that the respec­
tive event has made a difference only with respect to the degree and speed of 




























































































pects of self have become manifest in self-consciousness). In contrast, the se­
mantics of change proper allows for much wider a range of variation: depending 
on which event happened, and when, the present sense of self may have come to 
be entirely or largely different in its absence.
My exemplary cases have each singled out a specific aspect of the self as the 
self-description with regard to which their biographies are constructed in terms of 
continuity, invalidation, reinforcement, void, or switch, respectively. Those con­
structions and aspects all relate to the knowledge of HIV-positivity. The question 
as to the effects of diagnosis on the self thus bears crucial relevance for the status 
of the self which is hence established. Quite evidently, my respondents' explicit 
assessments of the effects of the thought of death are not disconnected from the 
respective patterns of biographical self-construction. The five patterns of self­
construction which have emerged from my empirical material may be ordered 
along the dimension "scope of change", with the patterns continuity and switch 
representing the opposite poles. Yet, it would be deceptive to dispose of the ques­
tion this way. First, degree of change does not coincide with speed of change. 
The pattern of continuity, for example, may include individuals who have noticed 
lots of change, albeit in a continuous way. Second, degree of change may not be 
predictive of its qualification in terms of self-cognition. It is possible to imagine 
cases who report to have changed completely, but who conceive of that vast 
amount of change in terms of enhanced self-knowledge. I will thus now briefly 
turn to my above exemplary cases to provide an empirical basis for the ensuing 
considerations.
The exemplary representatives of all five patterns of biographical self-reflec­
tion indeed talk about change when assessing the effects of the thought of death. 
This is true even of Paola, who has (as will be recalled) rejected the idea that she 
may have to change character. For her, the change consists of the need to estab­




























































































ously done. After joining the support-group, she started thinking of her positivity 
more than previously and, prompted by her peers, undertook "this work o f look­
ing into myself'. Yet the quality of self thus revealed, namely her egoism, did not 
provide her with much of a clue as to how she may now structure her life: the 
shadow of her past still looms large in that she has "lots o f projects and none". 
Paola says she is scared by the process of dying and all the suffering it may in­
volve, rather than by the idea of death as such. The thought of death does not 
play an active role for her self-construction - possibly because she was half 
aware, during her life as a drug-user, that she continuously risked dying by an 
overdose. In Paola's case, it is difficult for us as secondary observers to discern 
the effects of the thought of death as triggered by diagnosis, on one hand, from 
other factors (namely the effects of her suspension of habitual drug-abuse and of 
her involvement with peers), on the other. Former drug-users among the HTV- 
positive may be inclined to view the prospect of their own death as something 
unreal (given that they have often made return-trips to that barren land in the 
past); by the same token, the image of an ugly death of slow physical decay and 
prolonged suffering (as opposed the mystified, ecstatic death provided by heroin; 
compare Des Jarlais/Casriel/Friedman 1988) may be specifically likely to haunt 
ex-users.
Differently from Paola, an active use of the thought of death for the work of 
introspection is reported by Sergio, the exemplary case for the pattern of conti­
nuity. When now rereading the beginning of the interview with Sergio, we can 
notice that, while stating that diagnosis did not constitute a turning point in his 
life, he acknowledges a difference between some cloudy notion of "before", on 
one hand, and the present, on the other "the major or minor consciousness o f a 
problem". When later extending on this subject-matter, Sergio says that he 
needed a lot of time to realize that HTV was, despite of its asymptomatic charac­
ter, in some way present in his mind. He says he noticed that presence precisely 




























































































emerged, and 1 have understood that it was there." Throughout the first years of 
his life with the virus, he insists, he did not forget or deny that he was positive:
"I just did not know. That's to say, how to say, it's like having an object at 
home, and you don't know what to do with it. Then, some day, while you are 
doing some work, you say 'ah!' [he laughs], 'I may use the hammer to beat the 
nail'. In this sense I  have understood it."
The area of "work" for which the thought of mortality has turned out useful 
consists of Sergio's "inner life"-, in this way, as he goes on to explain, he discov­
ers things about himself similar to the way a scientist makes discoveries about his 
subject of study. Albeit at a completely different level of sophistication, Sergio 
qualifies his self-reflections in a way which resembles Paola's, namely as a work 
capable of revealing pre-existing features. The changes of his self which he has 
noticed in the course of a decade of life with the virus are thus conceived as "a 
course which I  find satisfactory and which /  would define as maturation, you see, 
as g r o w th the thought of death is understood, by Sergio, to have heightened his 
self-consciousness without having crucially altered the course of development.
As referred to Sergio's life, this seems a plausible perception: after all, there 
were no radical breaks. Diagnosis did not constitute a watershed; consequently, 
the question what would have happened if he had not turned out HIV-positive 
does not impose itself with particular insistence. In contrast, it strikes to leam 
that the development of her self is conceived as a process of maturation and 
growth also by Veronica - despite the fact that she spent the first years after diag­
nosis in deep depression, and despite the fact that she has qualified the two mo­
ments which marked the beginning and end of that crisis, respectively, as a dou­
ble transformation of self ("metamorphosis"). While having in the meantime re­
sumed her old self-definition as a highly ambitious person, Veronica does not 
think of herself exactly the way she used to before learning about her HTV-posi- 




























































































things weW'. Yet that contrast is related, by Veronica, essentially to her having 
grown olden "I don't like to think that I am like that only because 1 am seroposi­
tive. I  told you, having caught it at the age o f 20 ,1 would certainly have experi­
enced a process o f transformation, o f growth anyway".
Veronica plainly rejects the idea that the completely unforeseen life-event of 
diagnosis, which threw her in a turmoil for an extended period of time, and the 
ensuing lasting awareness of her own mortality, may have altered her self deci­
sively. Her assessment of the effects of diagnosis on her self becomes colourfully 
evident from the very way in which she acknowledges the relevance of her three 
years of crisis for the development of the heightened sense of purpose and re­
sponsibility which distinguishes her present pursuit of goals from the former one. 
Rather than as a contingent disgrace, Veronica constructs her HTV-positivity as a 
necessary experience in order for her to learn more about her true way of being:
"I think it's really a stage through which I  had to go, in the sense that 
throughout these three years I  have anyway come to know myself. I  have come 
to know what I  like, what I  don't like, what does me good and what doesn't. 
And then, you know, certainly from a, from a sad experience or anyway from a 
difficult experience emerges exactly the way you are".
A similar view is voiced by Giulio - although he did not yet manage to over­
come the crisis of his self-description which was triggered by the diagnosis of 
HIV a long eight years ago. Although he has been living in a state of continuous 
distress for many years, and although there are no signs that he may be close to 
finding a way out of the vicious circle in which he has got trapped, Giulio volun­
teers:
"You know, in a sense this thing, you see, it's odd... maybe it's stupid to say so 
and stupid to think so, but to have found myself in this very particular, very 




























































































being so present within myself, so deep with myself, you see, to dig so much 
within me - yes, it has enriched me a lot."
He goes on saying that it indeed is very strange to find a positive aspect in his 
experience, but that he has come to read and analyze himself intensely - without 
having decided so, i.e. in an involuntary way. Independently of the fact that the 
reason for this more reflexive attitude towards himself was not joy, but pain, he 
says, the result is the same: "to listen to oneself, to know oneself, to understand 
oneself, to read oneself as best as possible". To my question whether things 
would have evolved that way anyway, he first states that yes, fundamentally yes, 
because he is a very reflexive person - but that this trait would have been less 
intense:
"yes, [diagnosis and its consequences] gave it a decisive stamp, you see? A 
decisive stamp - in fact, its odd because what I  miss most maybe is really the 
fact, the devil-may-care attitude, as I told you earlier, which is the opposite, if 
you will. Being very superficial."
I agree: it is very odd that Giulio thinks he can establish a continuity between 
his present self-reflexivity, on one hand, and the regardless attitude which he sin­
gled out as the most precious aspect, and most painful loss, of the period prior to 
diagnosis, on the other. Indeed: did he not state, in one of the passages quoted in 
my earlier discussion of his case, that he would have to turn back by eight years 
if a cure should now come to be available to him? Part of what his present reflex- 
ivity helps him "read" more carefully than ever would thus precisely be the "true 
personality" which he says (in the piece discussed earlier) has come to be re­
pressed within himself. The thought of death seems to allow Giulio to stick to the 
conviction that his true personality exists independently of the observations he 
can make with regard to present actions: deep within himself, there lies an image 
of himself which he has conserved as valid despite its constant defiance by pres­




























































































about involuntarily as a result of lasting exposure to the thought of mortality. Just 
as the representatives of the patterns void, continuity, and reinforcement, the ex­
emplary case for the construction of self in terms of a lasting invalidation con­
ceives the effects of the thought of death on his self primarily as enhanced self­
cognition, rather than self-transformation.
Despite all their diversity, the four cases discussed thus far hence share a spe­
cific mode of biographical work. This common tendency to privilege self-cogni­
tion over self-transformation becomes all the more visible when now contrasting 
the above four cases with the representative of the pattern "switch". Francesco 
reports to have changed his self-definition - full stop. With regard to the thought 
of death, he voices precisely the same notion: that thought was intensely present 
only during the episode of dread described above. While he had previously de­
nied his condition, Francesco recounts, he does not deceive himself now: 
"Certainly, it is plain evident that we [people in my condition] have the sword 
[pending] over our head". Yet he sees no point in dwelling on the precariousness 
of his life now, after that intense moment of change: rather, he wants to enjoy the 
improvements which that crucial experience has made possible. In short, after the 
thought of death "has done its job" (as Francesco confirms my attempt at sum­
marizing), it has again left his mind's center stage.
In the light of the other four cases, Francesco's account is remarkable espe­
cially for what it lacks - namely an interpretation of his change of self as en­
hanced self-knowledge. On a first sight, this is just a natural way for Francesco to 
assess the effects of the thought of death on his self - after all, he has experienced 
a sudden shift of his old (indeed decades-old!) self-definition to its opposite. Yet, 
on closer consideration, his abstinence from qualifying his transformation as a 
progress of self-cognition does not seem to be a necessary complement of his 
switch of self. We can imagine, for example, that Francesco may have qualified 




























































































finally liberated after decades of unease with his life as an introvert. Yet this se­
mantics is not employed by Francesco - he simply states he changed, and that he 
now manages talking to others much more easily. Conversely, we can imagine 
that any of the above other four cases may have done without the semantics of 
self-cognition, and instead employ the semantics of self-transformation. Even 
Sergio, the champion of untainted continuity, may have said that, step by step, 
the lasting exposure to the thought of death has made him become strongly dif­
ferent from the way he used to be - and that this change would not, as far as he 
can tell, have come about under different circumstances. In other words: assess­
ments of the relationship between self-knowledge and self-transformation may be 
analytically disconnected from the specific patterns of biographical self-construc- 






























































































In this paper, I have distinguished five patterns of biographical self-construction 
of people with HIV or AIDS, namely invalidation, reinforcement, continuity, 
void, and switch of self. As I have furthermore shown, this variety relies on just 
two different ways of assessing the impact of the intense awareness of finitude on 
one's present sense of self. Granted that any self-observation is by definition self- 
cognitive, there are two categorically distinct ways of making such observations, 
depending on whether or not self-knowledge takes clear precedence over self­
transformation. To say "I have changed as a result of diagnosis" is different from 
saying: 'Diagnosis has revealed my true self to me". In the first of those two 
statements, the present sense of self is expressly viewed as a result of the particu­
lar life-event which propelled the intense awareness of one's own finitude. In 
contrast, in the second statement, the self is removed into a quasi-transcendental 
sphere: the aspects of self which are reported to have been revealed by the 
awareness of finitude are supposed to exist regardless of that awareness and the 
event which first triggered it. While, in the first case, the present qualities of the 
self are conceived as hinging on specific circumstances, in the second case, 
changes of knowledge about the self are not deemed to bear an intrinsic relation 
to changes of the self. In short, the assessment of the effect of diagnosis on one's 
self may or may not take the form of attributing, to one's self, the status of an 
ultimate standard - a standard, that is to say, which is supposed to transcend em­
pirical observability.
Among the respondents whose reports constitute the empirical basis of this in­
quiry, assessments of the effects of diagnosis in terms of "self-knowledge" were 
the rule, whereas the interpretation in terms of "self-transformation" was the ex­
ception both numerically and typologically: indeed, the latter could be observed 
in just one case, namely the one representative of the pattern "switch of self'. In 




























































































of biographical self-construction all relied on the assumption that their self was 
not substantially altered by the knowledge of being HIV-positive. Given that 
these biographical patterns (especially the patterns invalidation and reinforce­
ment) are crucially concerned with changes which came about as a result of di­
agnosis, this is a remarkable observation. In the late 20th century, in the absence 
of shared external standards which could reliably guide the process of self-consti­
tution as mortal, there is a tendency not just of establishing self-descriptions by 
reference to one's own distinctive individuality (rather than, for example, a gen­
eralized moral code), but also of turning such self-descriptions into quasi-tran- 
scendental entities. Faced with the prospect of finitude, unequivocal self-descrip­
tions seem to be needed - and the idea seems to be hard to bear that, had it not 
been for that nasty news ("HIV-positive"), one's self could have evolved differ­
ently. In this sense, the tendency to turn one's own self into the apriori of lived 
experience can be interpreted as a phenomenon pertaining to the cultural process 
which Nietzsche has termed "the death of God": by removing their own selves 
from the realm of contingency, contemporary individuals crave for a definite 
standard which, on closer scrutiny, cannot be sustained.9
This reasoning contains a plausible answer to my question as to the specifi­
cally modem form of self-constitution as mortal. Modem individuals can consti­
tute themselves as mortal beings in a variety of ways which all rely on the estab­
lishment of their own self as a definite standard; the effects of the thought of fini­
tude on the self are retrospectively bracketed by conceiving them primarily in 
cognitive terms, namely as an improvement of self-knowledge; the insight that 
one's present sense of identity is actually a result of having become intensely 
aware of the prospect of finitude hence becomes obscured; in short: the present





























































































sense of self is seen as a necessity. Self-transformation (i.e., a consciousness that 
one's present self is the effect of exposure to the intense thought of one’s own 
finitude) would hence constitute a different form of self-constitution as mortal - 
possibly one which points beyond the horizon of classical modernity.
There is a second, more daring answer to that question; it derives from the at­
tempt to again identify a common denominator of the semantics of self-knowl­
edge and of self-transformation, respectively. Is it possible to infer conclusions 
regarding the contemporary Western form of self-constitution as mortal from the 
fact that, in my wholly unrepresentative group of respondents, the case of 
"switch" was the only one who abstained from applying the semantics of self- 
knowledge?
Self-constitution as mortal is essentially tied to biographical time. To consti­
tute oneself as mortal means; to bring one's self-definition in tune with the pros­
pect of scarce future lifetime. It hence does not seem arbitrary to draw attention 
to three variables regarding time when drawing conclusions from the empirical 
material generated by this research. With regard to time, the exemplary cases of 
the four patterns invalidation, reinforcement, continuity, and void, on one hand, 
distinguish themselves from the one case of switch, on the other, in three ways. 
First, Francesco (the exemplary case of the pattern "switch") had learned about 
his positive serostatus just roughly a year before the interview (the intense crisis 
of self-description about which he reports actually preceded the interview by a 
few months only); in contrast, the representatives of the other four patterns were 
diagnosed between three and ten years before the interview. Second, Francesco 
was 46 years old at the time of diagnosis, while the age of my other four exem­
plary cases at the time of diagnosis ranges from 20 to 23 years. This is to say, 
while other respondents were diagnosed during a stage of their life in which the 
formation of their sense of identity was still in flux, Francesco already was a ma­




























































































is extraordinarily limited. While uncertainty about length of survival is a general 
aspect of HTV and AIDS, at the time of interview, Francesco is the only one 
among the five exemplary cases who has to face the prospect of possibly dying 
from one day to another. This minor life-expectancy is objectified by his T4- 
count of almost zero.
I shall like to interpret these features jointly by asking: what makes the seman­
tics of self-knowledge dispensable for Francesco? My answer to this question is 
double-faced. First, the contingent nature of the event of diagnosis and, more 
importantly still, of that event's effects on his self, are less evident to Francesco 
than they are to those other respondents: due to the comparatively short time 
which has elapsed since his uprooting crisis, he lacks the distance which may 
render the observation of that contingency possible, and thus potentially make his 
shift of self problematic for him. Yet second, even the insight into the contingent 
nature of that shift may not matter to Francesco, since he has come to know all 
too well who he is face-to-face his death. Short of statements which would under­
line the cognitive dimension of his sudden change, the lesson of his recent epi­
sode of intense dread is unambiguous: he does not want to end his life as an in­
trovert. Without any need for further consolidation by the semantics of self- 
knowledge, he knows who is going to die sooner rather than later. This certainty 
gives him the striking strength to now enjoy his newly acquired ability of opening 
up towards his social environment, rather than spending his residual time with 
worries about the proximity of death.
Consider, as a contrast, the exemplary cases of the other four patterns of bio­
graphical self-construction. In all those cases, the diagnosis of self had in some 
way interfered with the process of identity-formation throughout young adult­
hood - thus potentially leaving a disquieting doubt as to the validity and stability 
of the sense of identity which had emerged as its result. In all those cases, the 




























































































the diagnosis of the self, on one hand, and the self-construction established at the 
time of interview, on the other. The more detached a retrospective assessment is, 
the more easily will one observe that other developments would have been possi­
ble. Finally, all these individuals had to face uncertainty with regard to their fu­
ture survival - yet in a considerably less dramatic way than Francesco. For the 
exemplary cases who framed the effects of diagnosis in terms of self-knowledge, 
it was conceivable that future life-events would again bring about considerable 
alterations of their self-definition. Does it make sense to assume that such uncer­
tainty as to the future of one's present self-definition creates the need of enhanc­
ing its perceived stability - by retrospectively claiming its independence from any 
particular past event?
To be clear I do not want to imply that self-constructions of people with HIV 
or AIDS will necessarily be assessed in terms of self-knowledge on the condition 
that those three factors converge. My intention is to find out which, if any, may 
be the common denominator between approaches that, at a first sight, seem to be 
juxtaposed to one another, namely the predominance of self-transformation as 
against self-knowledge and vice versa. According to the line of thought which I 
am developing here, the insight into the character of one's current self as the ef­
fect of a particular past event may become bearable on the assumption of its fu ­
ture stability - in the very precise sense of stability until the expected time of 
death. The need to attribute necessity to the past development of one's self would 
hence stem from uncertainty as to the possibility of maintaining one's present self 
throughout all of one's future.
Just as with the first possible answer to my question regarding the current form 
of self-constitution as mortal, contemporary Western individuals would thus be 
able to face the prospect of their own finitude "stoically", i.e. with amazing calm, 
on the condition that they dispose of an unambiguous and stable sense of identity. 




























































































would now be supposed to refer not to the past, but to one's future; both self- 
knowledge and self-transformation would be potential modalities of the modem 
individual's self-constitution as mortal. The re-entry10 of the past into the future 
could hence occur in one of two distinct modes: the semantics of self-knowledge 
would be a means of committing oneself to a fundamental (if at times counter- 
factual) continuity between past and future, whereas certainty as to one's future 
identity would stem precisely from the contrast between past and present when 
applying the semantics of self-transformation.
This second line of interpretation has a particularly explorative character. Its 
implications, though, merit consideration: they include a hypothesis regarding the 
connection between the specific attitude taken towards death in contemporary 
Western societies, on one hand, and modem individuality, on the other. As I have 
remarked in the introduction to this paper, individuals in contemporary Western 
societies seem to have a specific problem with the thought of death which cannot 
simply be deduced from institutional developments. Not only does it seem to be 
less necessary for modem individuals to think of their own finitude as a real 
problem throughout the first, say, six decades of their lives (because longevity 
has increased); that thought also seems to generate a historically and culturally 
distinctive unease.
The above line of reasoning offers an explanation. Modem society subjects in­
dividual lives to an unprecedented fragmentation and discontinuity. In both per­
sonal and professional relations, the traditional dominance of lifetime commit­
ments has come to be largely eroded; the variety of demands made by different 
functional sub-systems of society on the individual impedes the formerly custom­
ary identification of self with regard to one's position in a particular family, status
10 For the definition and discussion of this concept, compare Luhmann 1984; 1987: 226 




























































































group or hierarchy. This has meant, as I have noted previously, that the individ­
ual's biographical reflections on her or his specificity as an individual have come 
to assume prime relevance for the construction of a sense of identity.
Now, when reflecting on a fragmented and discontinuous life, the individual 
will hardly come to generate a sense of identity capable of providing a commit­
ment for the future. Rather, the very adaptability to changing circumstances will 
assume crucial relevance for the way in which individuals think about their 
selves. This tendency of contemporary Western individuals to think of them­
selves as changeable with regard both to past and future has been theorized, over 
the past two decades, under a variety of labels such as the "mutable self' 
(Zurcher 1977), "biographical incrementalism" (Schimank 1985), and the 
"protean se lf' (Lifton 1993). This literature grasps a relevant aspect of the condi­
tions under which contemporary Western individuals are held to define them­
selves. The potential future reversibility of one's current self-definition has be­
come part of the contemporary seifs reflexive project. I assume that this is why 
the "taboo" of death could be observed at all: The current systemic pressure for 
individuals to keep their self-descriptions in a somewhat liquid state bears an at 
best ambivalent relationship to the thought of finitude. The intense awareness of 
one's own mortality is at odds with the provisional self-definitions required from 
contemporary individuals in order to function in a diversified and changing 
world.
I hence suggest that the central issue for understanding modem individuals' 
capability of facing finitude be their relation toward contingency. This argument 
has a Weberian genealogy: the more manifold and differentiated the society in 
which one lives, the less likely is it that one's death will be experienced as mean­
ingful (Weber 1920a: 569 f.). The conviction to have rendered one crucial aspect 
of self stable, and hence reliable, up to the time of death may be the one way out 




























































































riety of options for further activity and self-fulfillment, on one hand, and the fi­
nite character of our existence, on the other. There is a relevant practical implica­
tion to this consideration: the difficulties encountered by the HIV-positive in their 
attempt to render the thought of death compatible with their lives and selves are 
not to be understood in psychiatric, but in cultural terms; they highlight the more 
general difficulty encountered by contemporary Western individuals in their 
effort of coping with a world where previously incontestable external reference- 
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